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8.1  Introduction 
The purpose of  this paper is to investigate the nature and causes of 
wage differentials between large metropolitan areas in the United States. 
Most of the recent literature on this subject has concerned the question of 
whether  or not wages in the southern  United  States are lower than 
elsewhere.’ The current consensus is that,  although  there  is  a wide 
disparity in nominal wage levels between the South and elsewhere, there 
is virtually no difference in real wage levels. The results in the present 
paper  do not  contradict this conclusion; indeed, real wage levels in 
Atlanta,  Dallas,  and  Houston  are estimated to be  slightly higher  in 
1973-76 than wages in comparable cities in the North. 
There is, however, considerable variation in wage rates in large metro- 
politan areas throughout the United States. For example, the estimated 
nominal wage of a private sector, nonunion, white, full-time male paid by 
the hour is 10 percent less in Boston than in Detroit (the real wage is 23 
percent less). My purpose is to sort out why these differences exist. Are 
they best explained as a disequilibrium phenomenon, as the result of 
regional differences in the extent and nature of unionism, or as compen- 
sating differentials to reflect differences in the nonpecuniary attributes of 
areas? 
The first task of the study is to estimate the “area effects” on nominal 
wages for four different types of  workers (full-time male and female, 
hourly and salaried) from the May Current Population Survey data for 
1973-76.  These estimated area effects, which control for the standard 
human capital variables, race, unionism, and public sector employment, 
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are then converted into real area effects by subtracting the logarithm of 
the price level for each area from the nominal area effect. For women the 
dispersion of  area real wage levels across regions is smaller than the 
dispersion  of  nominal wages,  but for men it is greater.  There is, in 
addition, a positive correlation between both the nominal and real area 
effects for the four groups of  workers. In other words, whatever set of 
factors makes wages high or low in a particular city for one group of 
workers also makes them high or low for other groups of  workers. 
There is some rather weak evidence that the size of the real nonunion 
area effect is negatively related to the extent of unionization in the area. 
This is consistent with the standard hypothesis that individuals will accept 
nonunion jobs in an area with a high degree of  unionization at a lower 
wage than they would accept nonunion jobs in an area with a low degree 
of unionization. The reason for this is that their long-run income pros- 
pects may be better if they reside in an area with a greater probability of 
eventual attainment of a high-rent job. This runs counter to two hypoth- 
eses, which are reviewed in section 8.2, that predict that a large union 
sector will cause high union wages to “spill over’’  to the nonunion sector. 
The evidence on the distribution of  real nonunion area effects is not 
encouraging to either of  these hypotheses. 
8.2  Conceptual Issues 
Suppose we  observe that  nominal wage levels, after adjusting  for 
human capital, in different areas across the United States are subject to 
substantial variation. To what could this phenomenon be attributed? 
Since, as will be shown subsequently, interarea wage levels are subject to 
variation that is both large and persistent, it is useful at the outset to state 
the various hypotheses that might explain it: (a) Wage differences repre- 
sent a compensating variation to offset differences in price levels, nonpe- 
cuniary  attributes,  or both,  and  (b) wage  differences are caused  by 
institutional rigidities, primarily by differences in the nature and extent of 
unionism across areas. 
8.2.1  Compensating Variation 
If  there are no differences in the assessments by  individuals of  the 
nonpecuniary attributes associated with residence in different areas, as 
well as no institutional impediments to the adjustment of relative wages, 
we would expect the “real” wage in all areas to be equal. In its most 
straightforward terms, this implies that 
where the w’s are nominal wage levels and the p’s are price levels for 
areas i and  j.  If, for example, we observed that the nominal wage in area i 311  Intermetropolitan Wage Differentials in the U.S. 
were greater than that level that satisfies equation (l),  we would expect 
that there would be migration into the area sufficient to drive y/pi  down 
to the nationwide value of the real wage rate (w/pi)*.*  Thus, by this simple 
specification, the long-run supply curve to an area is perfectly elastic at 
the (w/p)*. It is, therefore, a labor supply condition rather than a conven- 
tional particular supply curve. 
In fact, the effect of  price variation across areas on the equilibrium 
regional wage structure is slightly more complicated than this. The pre- 
ceding discussion implies that, other things equal, a 1  percent increase in 
the cost of living in an area will increase the equilibrium wage in that area 
by 1 percent. This may not be true for two reasons: First, the nature of the 
tax and transfer system, and second, people have the option of retiring in 
areas with low price levels. 
To take a simple case, assume that the utility of  each person is a 
function of consumption during his working life (cl) and during retire- 
ment (c2) and that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., 
(2)  u=  a  log c1+ (1 -a)  log c2. 
Second, assume that federal income taxes may be approximated by  a 
linear function, +(wi -  X),  where tf is the marginal federal tax rate, withe 
gross earnings the individual earns in area i during his working life, and X 
the constant tax deduction (cumulated over his working life). In addition, 
the individual pays a proportional local income tax, tiwi, which is  not 
deductible from his federal tax base. Finally, upon his retirement the 
individual receives a social security payment of  S from the government, 
which is assumed to be independent of  wi.  If  the individual chooses to 




=  + v, -  pic, - -  c2  7 
where z is the interest rate (net of taxation, which is assumed to be solely 
federal), and pi is the price level in the area (including local sales and 
property taxes).  = wi(  1 -  tf -  ti) is the present value of net labor earn- 
ings (evaluated at the marginal rather than the average federal tax rate), 
and V, is the present value of  the income tax deduction and the social 
security payment. 
Maximization of  equation  (2)  with respect  to c1 and c2 subject to 
equation (3) yields a utility-maximizing  path of consumption over the life 
cycle. Plugging these values back into the utility function yields the utility 
associated with location in area i, and this depends on wi  andpi  as well as 
the various tax and transfer parameters. Labor supply equilibrium re- 
quires that the lifetime 'utility associated with  all areas be equal. Of 312  George E. Johnson 
particular interest for present purposes is the effect of changes in the two 
parameters subject to interarea variation,pi and 4, on the eqilibrium area 
wage level. This can be shown to be 
(4)  v, + v,  dti 
l-tf-ti  d(l0g Wi) = -  d(log Pi) + 
r/; 
The coefficient on d(1og pi) is  greater  than  one if  the tax system is 
progressive (X>O) or if  there is a social security system (and the tax 
system not too regressive). The reason for this is that higher values of X 
and S diminish the relative importance of  labor earnings in lifetime net 
income, thus requiring greater variation in wi  to compensate for a given 
variation in pi. Variation in local (proportional) income taxes, however, 
have the same effect on wi as one would expect on the basis of  the 
equalization of  after-tax wage rates. 
The second complication arises from the fact that an individual may 
move from  area  i .to area j  (where pi>pi). Moving costs, which are 
incurred in period 2, are M, so for a person who does move the budget 
constraint becomes 
c2  * 
1+2 
Repeating the procedure followed above, the effect of variations in pi on 
the equilibrium value of  wi  is equal to (d[log wi])ldti  is the same as in 
equation [4]) 
This may be greater or equal to one. If  V, and M  were zero, it would 
simply equal the share of first-period consumption in the utility function, 
which is less than one. The more important transfers are and the more 
progressive the tax system is, the larger the effect of  variations in area 
price levels is on the variation in area nominal wage levels. 
A second source of  variation in area real wage levels arises from the 
possibility that individuals may receive utility from specific nonpecuniary 
attributes of different areas. If, say, the San Francisco area is considered 
(over the relevant range) to be y more desirable in terms of  climate, 
physical beauty, public services (net of  taxes), and the like than the 
averge area in the country, then the equilibrium real wage in San Fran- 
cisco would be 1 -  y of the average real wage for all areas. The resultant 
supply curve would be horizontal at a lower real wage than that for the 
typical area (certainly lower than that of Buffalo). Compensation varia- 
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arising from the possibility of locational change upon retirement that was 
discussed above with  respect  to price  level differences.  This merely 
implies that nonpecuniary differences are less important than if  people 
never moved. 
Another variant of  the nonpecuniary model stresses that individuals 
have different tastes for different areas. For example, some individuals 
abhor climatic variation (and hence would sacrifice real income to live in 
San Diego) while others enjoy the “change of seasons” (and would, other 
things equal, prefer to live in Buffalo). This specification yields an up- 
ward-sloping equilibrium supply curve for each area that is the more 
elastic the less individuals’ assessments of the nonpecuniary attributes of 
different areas vary. The general model makes no prediction about the 
eqilibrium wage structure-if  real wages are high in area  i, it is not viewed 
as an attractive area. The general specification, however, predicts that, 
given stability over time in the distribution of  preferences, increases in 
the relative employment of  an area, which arise due to relative shifts in 
the demand functions, will be associated with increases in relative wages. 
Both of  the other specifications-nonpecuniary  attributes are (a) not 
important or (b) evaluated identically by everyone-predict  that there 
will be no relation between changes in relative wages and employment. 
8.2.2  Institutional Rigidities 
A second set of  reasons why nominal and real wage levels may vary 
across areas is the failure of  markets to adjust because of  institutional 
rigidities. The primary candidate for such a rigidity is, of  course, trade 
unionism-although  the federal government  and some local govern- 
ments have wage structures that are a similar source of  rigid it^.^ 
Now if  some areas were 100 percent unionized and unions were able to 
obtain a wage premium for their members, we would expect that the real 
wages of all the nonunion areas would be equal and the real wages of each 
union area to vary with the bargaining strength and success of the particu- 
lar unions in that area. Labor mobility in this case would equilibrate the 
expected incomes (or utility) of  each unionized area with that of  the 
nonunion areas, and the equilibrating variable would be the unemploy- 
ment rate in each unionized area.4 
In fact, no areas are 100 percent unionized; there is not even a major 
metropolitan areas of the United States in which a majority of the labor 
force is unionized. Some areas (especially in the New York to Chicago 
industrial belt) are relatively heavily (25-45  percent) unionized, while 
other areas  (especially in the South and Southwest) have very little 
unionization (10-15  percent). In this situation of partial unionization, we 
can observe equilibration through wage adjustment. 
First, if  individuals must live in an area to obtain a union job in that 
area, the equilibrium nonunion real wage in area i should depend nega- 314  George E. Johnson 
tively on the extent of unionism in that market. The reason for this is that 
the reservation wage of  a person in a market with a high probability of 
future high wages will be lower than that in a market with a low probabil- 
ity of future rents. If, however, it is not possible to move from a nonunion 
to a union job (because unemployed persons are able to corner the search 
market), the nonunion wage rate in a heavily unionized labor market will 
not be influenced by  the union wage. Instead, the nonunion wage will 
equal the nonunion wage in all other labor markets as well as the ex- 
pected value of the income (or utility) associated with attaching oneself to 
the unionized sector. 
Second, if  individuals do not have to live in an area to obtain a union 
job in a highly unionized area, they can search for high-rent jobs (by, say, 
telephone or  a two-day trip to Cleveland) without sacrificing their nonun- 
ion jobs in their initial area. In this circumstance, as in the case of  the 
inability to move from a nonunion to a union job, there would be no 
tendency for nonunion jobs in highly unionized markets to offer real 
wages that are lower than those in relatively unionized markets. 
The existence of  a relatively high degree of  unionization in an area 
may, therefore, lower the nonunion wage in an area or, under certain 
circumstances, have no effect on it. By the above arguments, however, it 
will not raise the nonunion wage. There are, however, two ways in which 
the existence of  a large union sector could increase the nonunion wage 
above that in relatively unorganized labor markets. 
First, assume that a nonunion employer could hire all the labor he 
wants at a wage of  wo.  However, the probability that his firm will be 
organized (that an NLRB certification election will be held and won by 
the union) is U = +(w/w,, U),  where w  is the wage he offers and Uis the 
extent of  organization in the area as a wh01e.~  Presumably,  <  0 (the 
firm is more likely to be organized the lower its wage offer is relative to 
the prevailing union wage), +* >  0 (organization is more likely the greater 
the extent of unionization in the area), and +12 <  0 (the reduction in the 
threat of  organization as w/w,  is increased the greater the extent of 
organization in the area). The expected wage rate that the firm will pay 
then depends on the wage it offers relative to the union wage, R = w/w,, 
and the extent of  unionization in the area, that is 
(7)  G=w,[+(R,  U)+R(l-+(R,  U))],  RZRo. 
If  there is an interior solution (i.e., diC/dR >  0 at R = Ro),  the value of R 
satisfies 
(8)  1 -  +(&  U)  + (1 -  R)+,(R, U)  = 0, 
and, given that +(l,  U)  = 0, the cost-minimizing relative wage offer is 
between Ro and 1. 
An example of  a functional form that satisfies the assumptions of  the 
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(9)  +(R, U)  = a0 U(1-  R)2. 
In this case the cost-minimizing relative wage offer is 
which is binding so long as R* >  Ro obviously increases as U increases; a 
decrease in a. (which would result from, say, passage of a right-to-work 
law in the area), would diminish the probability that the threat effect is 
operative. 
To the extent that the threat effect is operative in any  areas of  the 
country, it should be most important in those areas with relatively high 
degrees of unionization. In those areas (if, again, there are any), the only 
way that the market can equate the attractiveness of the area with that of 
other markets is for excess normal unemployment to occur. Jobs will be 
rationed in both the union and nonunion sectors-although  it is possible 
that the nonunion wage in a highly unionized area is still lower than that 
in  a weakly unionized  market. If  the threat effect is operative,  the 
nonunion wage is simply higher than that value that clears the market. 
The threat effect model may have had great general relevance for wage 
determination  in the United  States during the 1930s and 1940s-and 
there are still large firms that reputedly pay union wages in order to stave 
off organization. It may, however, seem a trifle unrealistic to attempt to 
apply the model to the larger part of the nonunionized sector. The union 
movement in the United States, it could be argued, it not very interested 
in attempting to organize most currently unorganized firms that are small, 
pay  low  wages,  and are characterized  by  rapid  labor turnover.  The 
marginal cost of servicing such bargaining units would, in most instances, 
be less than the marginal revenue. 
An argument could be made, however, that wages in the union sector 
could, even in the absence of  the threat of  organization, have a direct 
influence on the wage levels of  many nonunion firms. Suppose that a 
nonunion firm can hire as many workers as it wants at a wage wo,  but it 
realizes that the effort expended by the typical employee (u)  will depend 
positively on the wage the firm offers relative to the nonunion wage,6  say 
a = +(R, U),  where  >  0, Jt2 <  0, and 4tI2 >  0. The cost of a unit of effort 
is then 
and it is possible that the cost-minimizing relative wage offer is between 
Ro and 1. This will be the case if  the elasticity of  a with respect to R 
evaluated at Ro exceeds unity. 
This contamination effect model has roughly the same implications as 
the threat effect model. If  there is anything at all to the hypothesis, the 316  George E. Johnson 
work effort of nonunion members will depend more significantly on their 
wage relative to the union wage in highly unionized areas than in those 
areas that have little unionization because high union wages are much 
more visible in the former than the latter. For example, the typical 
nonunion employee working in a highly unionized area is more likely to 
have held a high-rent union job (a higher wage for the same work) than is 
an equivalent person residing in an area with low unionization and thus 
would be more sensitive to the size of  the unionhonunion differential. 
8.2.3  Demand-Determined Versus Supply-Determined 
Area Wage Levels 
To this point the discussion of area wage levels has been cast solely in 
terms of the supply side. A wage level in area i can deviate from that of 
other areas because a compensating variation is required or because of 
institutional considerations. For example, an area that is unattractive on 
nonpecuniary grounds will require high wage rates to attract workers. 
Given a finite long-run demand elasticity, the employment level in that 
area will be lower than if it were an attractive area, but there will still be a 
positive equilibrium employment level. 
If, however, output were a function solely of  labor and capital, the 
assumption of a finite demand elasticity would be wrong.’ If  the under- 
lying production function were linear homogeneous, the condition of 
equal returns to capital would imply that all wage rates must be equal in 
the long run. If  an area had a wage higher than any other area, its capital 
would flee and its employment would disappear.  In other words, the 
demand curve, like the supply curve ,  would be horizontal. 
On  the other hand, suppose that the underlying production function is 
linear homogeneous in three factors: labor (&),  capital (Ki),  and re- 
sources (Rf).  The last of these would include the industrial and commer- 
cial use of  land, water, locally produced energy, and the like. House- 
holds, whose number is proportional to Ei  ,  also demand resources-land 
for houses, water for swimming pools, etc., and the aggregate use of 
resources by households is Rf.  I will assume, for the sake of  simplicity, 
that each area has a fixed stock of  resources (Ri)  for both uses, i.e., 
The utility function for each household is given by  ul.  = Ai+(ci,  Ti), 
where Ai  is an area shift parameter reflecting the nonpecuniary attributes 
of  the area, rj is lifetime consumption of  resources, and cj  lifetime con- 
sumption of  all other goods. Ignoring taxes and area variations in the 
price of ci  (as well as the possibility of movement to low price level areas 
upon  retirement),  Ui is  maximized subject to the budget  constraint 
wj =  ci  + bjri,  where bj is the price of  a unit of  resources. Thus, each 
household will demand r(bi,  wj)  units of resources, and the total demand 
for resources by households in the area is 
R~  = R: + R?. 317  Intermetropolitan Wage Differentials in the U.S. 
(12)  R: = r(6,,  wi)Ej, 
where a(log r)/a(log 6,)  = -  qb  and d(log r)/d(log w,)  = qw  are the price 
and income elasticities of  demand. 
Equalization of  net advantages of all areas implies that the total deriva- 
tive of the utility function with respect to  A,, wi,  and b, be equal to  zero, or 
(13)  dQ  = +dAi + Ai+l(d~i  -  ridbi) = 0. 
Upon manipulation of  this, we have 
d(l0g w;)  = -- -  d(1og A,) + pd(1og b,), 
0  (14) 
where  0 = c,+~/+ is the elasticity of  utility with respect to ci  and p = 
b,r,/w;  is the share of  household income going to the consumption of 
resources. 
On the factor demand side, the aggregate production function for the 
area is Q,  = F(E,,  K;, R!).  It is assumed that F is linear homogeneous 
and, for simplicity, that the elasticities of substitution between each of the 
three factors are identical (u). Thus, the logarithmic derivatives of the 
three factor prices are given by 
1-a  (15) d(1og w;)  = -Ld(log  E;)  +sd(log  Ki)  +%d(log Rt), 
U  U  U 
a  1-a 
(16) 
and 
0 = Ad(log E,) -  Ld(log  K;) + zd(log  R:), 
U  U 
d(log Rt), 
a  a  1 -  a3 
(17)  d(l0g b;)='d(log  Ei) +Ad(log Kj) -- 
U  U  U 
where a*,  a2,  and a3  are the three factor shares (which sum to one). The 
left-hand side of equation (16) is set equal to zero, reflecting the fact that 
the return to capital in  all areas must be equal. 
Since the fixed stock of resources in the area is divided between use by 
firms and households, i.e., Ri  = Rf + RF, it follows that 
(18)  d(l0g Ri)  = kd(1og Ri)  + (1 -  k)d(log RF), 
where k = R:/Rj  is the fraction used by firms. Differentiating (12) loga- 
rithmically, 
(19)  R:) = -qbd(log  bi) + qwd(lOg wi) + d(lOg Ej)  . 
Substituting (19) into (18) and solving for (18), we obtain 318  George E. Johnson 
d(1og Ei).  1-k  -- 
k 
Ri is allowed to vary to see how changes in the supply of  resources in an 
area influence the other variables. 
Equations (20), (14), (16), (17), and (18) can be manipulated to see 
how variations in the two exogenous variables, Ai and Ri,  influence each 
of the five endogenous variables, wi,  bi,  Ei,  Ki,  and Ri  . The determinant 
resultant system is 
which is positive if  a3  >  0 (firms use resources) or P >  0 (households use 
resources).  This implies that  there will  be  a  unique  solution  of  the 
endogenous variables of the model unless land, water, and the like are in 
infinite supply in each area. 
An increase in the aggregate supply of  resources in an area has no 
effect on the equilibrium levels of  wi  and bi.  The two variable prices are 
only determined by the shift parameter Ai, that is 
a(log wi) =  "3  1-P 
a(logAi)  a3+  0  ' 
(22) 
and 
d(log bi) =  "1  1-p 
qiog AJ  (y3 + pal  0  (23) 
The effect of  changes in the two exogenous variables on the level of 
employment is seen to be 
1-p  d(1og Ai)  + d(1og Ri)  . 
0 
Although wi is an endogenous variable in the model, a quasi-elasticity of 
labor demand, d (log EJd (log wi)  holding Ri  constant, can be obtained by 
dividing the coefficient on d(1og Ai)  in (24) by the negative of  (22). This 
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which is finite if  a3  >  0, i.e., if firms use scarce natural resources as well as 
capital and labor. 
The preceding model is merely an attempt to justify why I assume that 
there could be a regional labor market equilibrium with different area 
wage levels. It could also be extended in several directions-addition  of 
variations in the prices of other goods due to transportation costs, taxes, 
the possibility of movement upon retirement, and the like. 
8.3  Data and Initial Results 
In order to estimate wage differentials between regions, it is necessary 
to adjust for the other factors that influence wages. To do this I shall 
employ the standard technique for analyzing the determinants of wages 
from cross-sectional data: the earnings function. The hourly wage of each 
worker is  assumed to depend on four sets of  variables:  (a) skill, (b) 
compensating, (c) discrimination, and (d) rent variables. In terms of the 
CPS data I shall use in the analysis, the specification of the model is, for 
each sex, 
(26)  log w = a0 + alS  + azX  + a3X2  + qBL  + aYgOTH 
I- 1 
i=  1 
+a6U+a7PUB+a8U~PUB+  X  yiARj 
J- 1  K-  1 






= hourly nominal wage rate of  a person 
= years of  schooling attended 
= years of  potential labor market experience (age -  S -  5) 
= one/zero dummy variable for blacks 
OTH = dummy variable for race other than black or white 
U  = dummy variable for union membership 
PUB  = dummy variable for public employment 
ARj  = set of dummy variables for geographic location 
INDj  = set of  dummy variables for industry 
OCCk  = set of  dummy variables for occupation. 
The skill variables are proxies for the individual’s stock of  human 
capital and typically include S,  X and its square, as well as some measure 
of  innate ability.  The Current Population Survey data set, however, 
includes no estimate of ability. a1  = a(log W)/aS-  (W, -  Ws- l)/Ws-  is 
(approximately) the rate of  return to schooling without allowance for its 
resource cost. Past earnings function estimates have always found that 320  George E. Johnson 
a2  >  0 and a3  >  0, presumably reflecting a diminishing rate of investment 
in human capital over the life cycle. 
The compensating variables include several factors. First, W is mea- 
sured in nominal terms, so, other things equal, wages should vary more or 
less in proportion to the price level of  the region of  residence of  the 
worker. Second, some jobs are more onerous or dangerous than others, 
and persons in the “bad” jobs should receive a compensating differential. 
Similarly, employment in certain industries is subject to severe seasonal 
(e.g.,  construction)  or cyclical (e.g.,  durable  goods  manufacturing) 
fluctuations, so persons in these industries should receive a higher hourly 
wage than persons in industries with secure employment. Third, areas 
that are attractive in terms of  climate, physical characteristics, the net 
quantity and quality of public services, and the like should offer lower 
wages, ceteris paribus, than unattractive places. 
In terms of the CPS data set, the second set of factors may be proxied 
(albeit somewhat imperfectly) by the industry and occupational dummy 
variables (IND and OCC). To a certain extent, however, these variables, 
especially the latter, are proxies for skill and luck, and I will present 
estimates of the major coefficients based on a basic model (without IND 
and OCC) and a full model (including them). 
The first and third sets of factors are related to the interpretation of the 
set of coefficients that is central to this paper, those on the AR variables. 
The coefficient yi  is the logarithmic difference, after accounting for the 
influence of the other variables, between the wage level in area i and the 
(arbitrarily excluded) area 1. Thus, the ratio of what a person would earn 
in area i relative to area i’ is w./M$’  = exp(yi -  yi’). The nominal area 
effect is yi, and the real area effect is yi minus some function of the area 
price level,  pi.  The discussion in section 8.2 suggested that, in the absence 
of either government transfers or the possibility of postretirement migra- 
tion, the appropriate function is log pi.  If  one used log W -  logp, instead 
of  log W in the earnings function, the area coefficients would be inter- 
preted in real rather than in nominal terms-exactly what one would get 
by subtracting log pi from the estimated nominal area effects. Since it is 
useful to hold open the question of how variations in area prices influence 
equilibrium area wage levels, I will  estimate the earnings function in 
nominal terms. 
The discrimination variables are represented in the United States by 
sex and race. Because (1) the preferences for different types of jobs may 
differ between men and women and (2) the potential experience variable 
is a much worse proxy for actual experience for women than for men, the 
model is estimated separately for the two sexes. Some of  the difference 
between the predicted earnings of  men and women for a given set of 
values of  the independent variables may represent direct labor market 
discrimination against women, but it is impossible to tell how much. 321  Intermetropolitan Wage Differentials in the U.S. 
Similarly, differences  in  the area coefficients between  the sexes are 
consistent with both differential degrees of labor market discrimination 
against women  and differences in  the tastes  of  men and women for 
particular areas. 
The coefficients on BL and OTH in equation (26) represent the loga- 
rithmic difference between the wages of  each group relative to whites, 
other factors held constant. Thus, blacks earn exp(a4) of  the wages of 
whites with the same observed qualifications, or, by one interpretation, 
employers behave as if  they taxed black workers by 1 -  exp(a,)  of their 
wage bill. This specification assumes that the proportional black/white 
differential is identical in all regions.8 
The principal rent variable is unionism, and much attention in labor 
economics has focused on estimation of  the union/nonunion relative 
wage advantage, exp(a6) -  1,  for private sector employees. In addition, 
it is possible that public employees earn more or less than their private 
sector counterparts, and the union/nonunion wage differential may be 
different in the public and private sectors. These last two possibilities can 
be tested by seeing if  a7  and  in (26) are significantly different from 
zero. As with the case of the race variables, equation (26) assumes that 
unionism has the same proportionate impact on the wage in all areas. It is 
possible, however, that unions create a national wage scale, implying that 
the coefficients will vary less for union workers than for nonunion work- 
ers. To test this hypothesis, the model can be run separately for union and 
nonunion workers. 
The data on which equation (26) is estimated are from the Current 
Population Survey for May of  1973 through 1976. The sample consists of 
all persons during each sample week who were (a) employed (but not 
self-employed or farmers), (b) between the ages of  17 and 72, inclusive, 
(c) had a positive wage, (d) were employed on a full-time basis, and (e) 
resided in one of the thirty-four large Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (SMSA) that are identifiable in the data set. In testing for the 
consistency of the results for the two wage measures, it became clear that 
for both men and women the estimated parameters of the basic model 
differed greatly with respect to the method by which the individual was 
paid (hourly versus salaried). Thus, the total sample of 43,940 persons 
during the four years was divided into four subsamples: (A) male hourly, 
(B) female hourly, (C) male salaried, and (D) female salaried. 
The estimated coefficients of  the basic model (that does not include 
industry and occupational dummy variables) are presented in table 8.1. 
These regressions do include thirty-three dummy variables for SMSA 
(Detroit is the excluded area), and these coefficients  are discussed below. 
The results on the skill variables suggest that schooling and potential 
experience have a greater effect on the earnings of salaried workers than 
on those of  hourly workers.  As expected on the basis of  several past 322  George E. Johnson 
Table 8.1  Estimated Coefficients for Basic Model 
(estimated standard errors in parentheses) 
Hourly  Salaried 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
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studies, experience is a much more important determinant of earnings for 
men than for women. The estimated differential between the wages of 
white and nonwhite workers is larger for men than women. 
The estimated effect of union membership on the earnings of full-time 
workers is quite large (a 28.7 percent advantage for men and a 20.2 
percent advantage for women in the private sector), but it is much smaller 
for full-time salaried workers (1.9 percent for men and 8.1 percent for 
women). Being employed in the public sector increases the wages of 
women workers and male hourly workers by approximately 15 percent, 
but it has no effect on the earnings of  salaried males. The estimated 
impact of public sector unions on wages, the sum of the coefficients on U 
and PUB x U, is, for full-time workers, greater for women than men and 
for hourly than salaried workers. 323  Intermetropolitan Wage Differentials in the U.S. 
The predicted hourly wage rates of  a typical worker-white,  private 
sector, twelve years of schooling, age 35-in  Detroit in 1973 in each of the 




Nonunion  Union  Sector Unionized 
A. Full-time hourly male  4.31  5.54  56 
C.  Full-time salaried male  5.67  5.78  17 
D. Full-time salaried female  3.78  4.09  9 
Notice that the only group which private sector union membership is 
extensive is A, hourly males. In fact, whereas group A workers compose 
only 28 percent of total private sector employment, they have 58 percent 
of  total private sector union membership. The impact of unionism on the 
wage rates of this group is such that a unionized male hourly worker has 
almost as high a wage as a salaried male worker. 
B.  Full-time hourly female  2.90  3.49  22 
8.4  Differences in Wage Levels between Areas 
The four  regressions in table 8.1 also include thirty-three  dummy 
variables for SMSA of  residence of  the individual. The null hypothesis 
that the presence of these does not add sufficiently to the explanation of 
log w  to justify the sacrifice of 33 degrees of freedom-i.e.,  that nominal 
wage levels for each of  the groups do not differ among the thirty-four 
areas-is  decisively refuted for the four groups (F  values between 9 and 
15 compared to F,,(33,  m) = 1.44). 
Table 8.2 reports the point estimates of  the coefficients on the area 
variables for the four groups of full-time employees. The “basic” model 
refers to the standard earnings functions, whose other coefficients were 
given in table 8.1, and the “full” model includes dummy variables for 
both industry and occupation at the one-digit aggregation. Each of  the 
coefficients represents the estimated logarithmic deviation of  the area 
effect for that area less that for Detroit. Thus, from the basic model, male 
hourly workers in New York, given their education, experience, race, 
union membership, and public/private status, earn exp( -  .109) = 89.7 
percent  of  what  comparable  workers  in  Detroit  earn.  They  earn 
exp( -  .lo9 + .249) = 115.0  percent  of  what  comparable  workers  in 
Tampa earn. The estimated standard errors of the differences in the area 
coefficients range from a low of about .015  for areas with large samples of 
a subgroup to almost .050 for areas with very small samples. For example, 
the New York/Detroit relative for group A workers has a standard error Table 8.2  Estimated Logarithmic Difference between Wage Levels in Thirty-four SMSA’s and Detroit 
for Full-Time Hourly and Salaried Workers, by  Sex, 1973-76 
Hourly  Salaried 
Men  Women  Men  Women 
SMSA  Basic  Full  Basic  Full  Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
East 
1. New York 
4.  Philadelphia 
8. Boston 
9. Nassau-Suffolk 







11. St. Louis 
13. Cleveland 
16.  Minneapolis 
-  .lo9 
-  .082 
-  ,103 
.020 
-  ,183 
-  .110 
-  .048 
-  .161 
-  .009 
,000 
-  ,058 
-  ,075 
.ooo 
-  .116 
-  ,116 
-  ,146 
-  ,033 
-  .187 
-  .124 
-  ,085 
-  ,143 
-  ,036 
.ooo 
-  .088 
-  ,097 
-  ,038 
.031 
-  ,071 
-  .016 
.008 
-  ,172 
-  .087 
.010 
-  ,098 
,018 
.Ooo 
-  ,096 
-  ,097 
-  ,025 
-  ,049 
-  .180 
-  .020 
-  ,088 
-  ,129 
-  .078 
-  .118 
-  ,149 
-  .026 
.Ooo 
-  ,121 
-  ,149 
-  .087 
-  ,144 
-  .128 
-  .158 
-  .033 
-  .188 
-  .094 
.016 
-  ,230 
-  .056 
.Ooo 
-  .117 
-  .081 
-  ,059 
-  .lo4 
-  ,117 
-  .129 
.002 
-  .164 
-  .086 
.032 
-  .2oo 
-  ,034 
.Ooo 
-  .120 
-  ,072 
-  .044 
-  ,005 
-  ,160 
-  .077 
-  .046 
-  .172 
-  .139 
-  .033 
-  ,264 
-  .049 
.Ooo 
-  .178 
-  .164 
-  .137 
-  .015 
-  .172 
-  ,090 
-  .047 
-  .184 
-  .140 
-  ,025 
-  .248 
-  .066 
.Ooo 
-  .172 
-  .160 
-  .143 20.  Milwaukee  -  ,038  -  ,051  -  .021  -  ,022  -  ,089  -  ,081  -  ,117  -  ,135 
22. Cincinnati  -  ,119  -  ,145  -  .096  -  ,202  -  ,227  -  ,209  -  .261  -  ,234 
27.  Kansas City  -  ,083  -  ,107  -  .132  -  ,166  -  ,192  -  .168  -  ,226  -  ,211 
30.  Indianapolis  -  ,080  -  ,116  -  ,068  -  ,054  -  ,127  -  .124  -  .214  -  ,201 
South 
7. D.C.  ,071  -  ,012  .003  -  .015  .018  .007  -  .032  -  ,135 
12. Baltimore  -  ,070  -  ,116  -  .038  -  .050  -  .151  -  ,138  -  ,150  -  ,146 
14. Houston  -  ,031  -  ,120  -  .167  -  .116  -  ,060  -  .057  -  ,215  -  ,216 
17. Dallas  -  ,168  -  .202  -  ,098  -  .189  -  ,115  -  .lo3  -  .239  -  ,218 
21.  Atlanta  -  .073  -  ,111  -  ,040  -  ,142  -  ,112  -  ,096  -  .126  -  .130 
26.  Miami  -  .149  -  ,179  -  .141  -  .132  -  ,285  -  .232  -  ,190  -  ,179 
32.  New Orleans  -  ,115  -  ,190  -  .227  -  .144  -  ,142  -  .140  -  ,290  -  ,274 
33. Tampa  -  ,249  -  ,283  -  ,216  -  ,264  -  ,300  -  ,278  -  .303  -  .290 
West 
2.  Los Angeles  -  ,103  -  ,109  -  ,015  -  ,076  -.115  -  ,087  -  ,087  -  .050 
6.  San Francisco  .024  ,020  ,034  .061  -  ,089  -  ,058  -  ,044  -  .049 
18. Seattle  -  ,066  -  ,077  -  .075  -  .094  -  ,093  -  ,082  -  .169  -  .135 
19. Anaheim  -  ,053  -  ,073  -  .060  .004  -  .069  -  ,063  -  .120  -  .128 
24.  San Diego  -  ,089  -  .127  -  .lo5  -  ,079  -  .187  -  .168  -  ,158  -  .149 
28.  Denver  -  .028  -  ,083  -  ,081  -  ,082  -  ,144  -  ,141  -  ,143  -  ,133 
29. San Bernardino  -  ,071  -  ,099  -  .146  -  .175  -  ,212  -  .059  -  .227  -  .186 
31.  San Jose  ,011  -  .003  .017  ,053  -  .071  -  ,076  -  .061  -  ,045 
34.  Portland  -  ,067  -  ,075  -  ,074  .ooo  -  .182  -  ,146  -  ,163  -  .131 
NOTE:  Numbers before SMSAs indicate population ranking in 1976. 326  George E. Johnson 
of  1.7 percent, the New York/Tampa relative a standard error of  2.9 
percent. 
To adjust these estimated nominal wage effects for prices, I used the 
BLS index of comparative living costs for an “intermediate” living stan- 
dard for 1974.9  Most of the variation in this price index is due to variations 
in housing costs and taxes.” The elasticity of the equilibrium wage level in 
a region with respect to the local price level may be, as shown in section 
8.2, greater or less than one, but I initially constrained its impact to be 
one. Thus, the estimated real area effect is the estimated nominal effect 
less the logarithm of  the price level, and these are shown for hourly 
workers in table 8.3. (For salaried workers the real area effect can be 
calculated by taking the nominal area effect in table 8.2 and subtracting 
the natural logarithm of  the price level-normalized  at one rather than 
100.) To obtain the estimated average area effect, one averages the union 
and nonunion wage levels, which is done by adding the estimated coef- 
ficient on union membership (.25 for men and .18 for women) times the 
proportion of  hourly private sector workers who are unionized. This is 
then exponentiated and normalized at Detroit equal to 100. 
One index of  the dispersion  of  area wage  rates is  the  (weighted) 
standard deviation of the logarithm of  the area effects. This is shown in 
table 8.4 for the nonunion area effect and the average (i.e., including 
unionism) for both nominal and real area effects. (Since unionism has 
little direct impact on the wages of  salaried workers, the dispersion of 
average wages of  salaried workers is not reported.) One might suspect 
that the dispersion of real area effects would be lower than the dispersion 
of  nominal area effects if  workers move between areas to equalize net 
returns. In fact, this is true for both groups of women workers, but it is 
greater for both groups of  men workers. 
What this implies is difficult to tell. First, the dispersion of  real area 
effects will only be lower than the dispersion of nominal area effects if the 
slope coefficient of  a regression of  the nominal area effect on the log of 
area  price  level is greater than  .5.”  As  shown in  section  8.2, a(log 
wi)/a(log  pi)  can  be  less  than  one even  in  a world  of  real  income- 
maximizing suppliers of labor. Further, to the extent that area price levels 
are measured with error, the implicit coefficient of log wi on logpi will be 
biased down, thus increasing the estimated variance of  log(  wi/pi). 
If there are no threat or contamination effects, the nonunion wage for a 
group for which there is a significant union effect will depend negatively 
on the extent of unionism in the area. Since the estimated uniodnonun- 
ion effect is positively only for hourly workers, we would therefore expect 
that the extent of unionism would have a negative effect on the area effect 
for  nonunion wages. On the other hand, if  either the threat or contamina- 
tion effect were operative, we would expect that the relation between the 
nonunion area effect and unionism would be much weaker-posibly  even 327  Intermetropolitan Wage Differentials in the U.S. 
positive. For male hourly workers the coefficient of the logarithm of  the 
real area effect for nonunion workers on the extent of unionism is -  .15 
(.09). This implies that the real nonunion wage level is about 9 percent 
lower in a heavily unionized area (about 75 percent) than in a weakly 
Table 8.3  Estimated Real Wage Levels (wlp)  for Private Sector Hourly 
Workers in Thirty-three SMSA’s (Detroit =  100) 
SMSA 
Men  Women 
Price  Nonunion  Average  Nonunion  Average 
Level  Wage  Wage  Wage  Wage 
East 
1. New York 
4.  Philadelphia 
8.  Boston 
9.  Nassau-Suffolk 
10. Pittsburgh 
15. Newark 
23.  Paterson 
25.  Buffalo 
Midwest 
3.  Chicago 
5. Detroit 
11. St. Louis 
13. Cleveland 
16. Minneapolis 
20.  Milwaukee 
22.  Cincinnati 
27.  Kansas City 





21.  Atlanta 
26.  Miami 
32.  New Orleans 
33. Tampa 
West 
7.  D.C. 
2. Los Angeles 
6. San Francisco 
18. Seattle 
19. Anaheim 
24.  San Diego 
28.  Denver 
29.  San Bernardino 
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Table 8.4  Standard Deviation of Estimated Area Wage Effects 
for Four Subgroups 
Average Wage  Average Wage 
Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real 
Male hourly  ,066  ,084  .085  ,082 
Female hourly  ,070  ,061  .080  .057 
Male salaried  ,077  ,085 
Female salaried  ,084  ,069 
-  - 
-  - 
unionized area (about 15 percent), but this estimate is subject to a large 
standard error. For female hourly workers this coefficient is -  .20 (.lo), 
which, given the range of  the extent of  unionism, is actually a smaller 
effect. 
One implication of both the threat and contamination effect models of 
the spillover of union wages to the nonunion sector is that the nonunion 
wage will depend positively on the extent of  organization only when the 
extent of  unionism is fairly large. The threat or contamination effect 
should be fairly small (or nonexistent) until unionism reaches a certain 
proportion-then  they  will  be rather extensive. To test this I  added 
quadratic terms so that the logarithm of the nonunion real area effect was 
a function of  U and U2  for both men and women hourly workers. The 
above argument would suggest that their coefficients would be negative 
and positive, respectively. The results, for both men and women, were 
the opposite-although  the negative coefficient on the U2  term domi- 
nates the positive coefficient on U.  Adding dummy variables for certain 
“troublesome” areas (specifically, Detroit, which seems to be a special 
case, and Washington, D.C., which is dominated by a high-rent public 
sector), did nothing to upset the conclusion that there is little to the 
spillover hypotheses. 
Notes 
1. See, e.g., Scully (1969), Coelho and Ghali (1971), Bellante (1979), and Goldfarb and 
Yeager (1981). 
2.  It is, of course, possible that this migration takes a long time to occur so that there is at 
any time a large disequilibrium component in any observed distribution of  regional wages. 
In the United States, however, there is a considerable amount of interarea labor mobility. 
For example, between March 1969  and March 1979,2.9 percent of the male population from 
35 to 44  years of  age moved between states; for males ages 45 to 64  the mobility rate was 1.5 
percent. Now even if  some of  this mobility is not related to economic migration (e.g., a 
move from Cos Cob, Connecticut to Short Hills, New Jersey), there appears to be enough 
movement  to eliminate disequilibrium rather quickly. 329  Intermetropolitan Wage Differentials in the U.S. 
3.  Specifically, the federal government offers wage rates that are considerably in excess 
of the reservation prices of potential employers. For an empirical study of this phenomenon, 
see Smith (1976). 
4.  The original  application  of  the  Harris-Todaro  framework  to the explanation  of 
regional differentials in unemployment was Hall (1970). 
5. The original formulation of  the “threat effect” model was done by  Rosen (1969). 
6. For a discussion of some further implications of  the assumption of “interdependence” 
of  different workers’ utility functions, see Hamermesh (1975). 
7. This point is stressed in Richard Muth’s comment on  this paper. The  following section 
is a reply to that part of  his comments. 
8.  It is, of  course, likely that this assumption is not correct, as indeed has been demon- 
strated with respect to broad regional groups by Kiefer and Smith (1977). I did run my basic 
regressions separately for blacks and whites, but, despite the fact that estimated differen- 
tials between blacks and whites were somewhat larger in southern SMSA’s than elsewhere, 
it made very little difference in the estimation of  area effects. 
9. The price levels for New York, Nassau-Suffolk, Newark, and Paterson are the New 
YorkRVew Jersey rate; Miami and Tampa are assigned the level for Orlando; Anaheim and 
San Bernadino, the Los Angeles level (which equals the San Diego level); New Orleans, the 
Baton Rouge level; and San Jose, the San Francisco/Oakland  level. No price level was 
available for Portland, Oregon. 
10. The standard deviation of  the logarithm of  the housing component of  the index for 
1974 was .132; for taxes it was .204. All other categories-except  medical, which had a 
relatively low weight-varied  by .06 or less. 
11. Let A; and Ni be the real and nominal area effects and pi the logarithm of  the area 
pricelevel. ThenA, = N.  -pi,  andvar(Ai) = var(N,) + var(pi) -  2cov(Ni,pi) = var(Ni) 
+ var(pi)(l -  2bN.p).  Thus, var(Ai) < var(Ni) only if  bN.p  > .5. 
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Comment  Richard F. Muth 
George Johnson’s paper is the most thorough, carefully done study of 
intercity wage differentials that I have seen. Because of the great detail in 
the data set he uses, Johnson is able to eliminate the effects of a variety of 
other influences on wages and salaries which other studies have only 
partially controlled for. Among these other factors are schooling, poten- 
tial labor force experience, race, union membership, public employment, 
industry, and occupation. Moreover, separate regressions are run for 
men and women and for hourly and salaried workers. The area effects 
which Johnson estimates are therefore remarkably free from the effects 
of  possible correlation with omitted variables. 
Yet, because of the attention given earlier in the paper to the effects of 
intercity differences in the prices of  consumer goods on nominal wage 
levels in  equilibrium, I was  somewhat surprised  that  Johnson didn’t 
include the BLS intercity living cost index as an explanatory variable in 
his nominal wage regressions. Earlier he argues correctly that progressive 
taxation of  nominal earnings and social security payments upon retire- 
ment may make the partial derivative of  the equilibrium wage rate with 
respect to consumer  goods prices greater  than  unity.  The option  of 
retirement to a low-price area coupled with moving costs can make this 
partial derivative either greater or less than one. Surely then, it is not 
correct to divide the estimated area effect on nominal wages by the area’s 
price index to obtain the real area effect, as Johnson does. Indeed, his 
finding of a greater area dispersion of  real area effects for men than for 
nominal effects may merely reflect the fact that the former were incor- 
rectly estimated. 
In the earlier part of his paper, Johnson devotes considerable space to 
the effect of nonpecuniary advantages and disadvantages on equilibrium 
wage levels. I would have found it interesting if  measures of such effects 
had been included among the explanatory variables and their effects on 
area wage levels calculated. A variety of  such variables have been in- 
cluded in various spatial studies, especially studies of  intermetropolitan 
migration. Variables related to weather, such as heating degree days 
(essentially the absolute difference between average temperature and 
Richard F. Muth is professor of  economics at Stanford University. 331  Intermetropolitan Wage Differentials in the U.S. 
some level such as 50 degrees Fahrenheit if the former is smaller summed 
over the year), cooling degree days (similarly defined), humidity, and 
annual rainfall,  are obvious candidates for inclusion. Other such vari- 
ables might include proximity to oceans and to mountains and the pres- 
ence of  a symphony orchestra, or, if  my tastes are indicative, a profes- 
sional football team.  Not  only  would  the effects of  such  factors on 
(supposedly equilibrium) wage levels be of considerable interest but any 
remaining  areal effects  would  approximate  disequilibrium  wage  dif- 
ferences. 
My greatest single criticism of Johnson’s paper, however, is its neglect 
of  demand-side variables. Implicit in the paper, it seems to me, is the 
hypothesis that area demand curves for labor are downward sloping to 
the right. This would be the case if products produced in a particular place 
were either unique or  sold to a limited market area surrounding the city in 
which  they  are produced.  If  such were the case  and there were  no 
important differences among workers in the value placed upon nonpe- 
cuniary advantages, long-run horizontal labor supply curves would fix 
equilibrium wage levels. Forces influencing the area’s demand curve for 
labor would then affect its total population and employment but would 
have no influence on long-run equilibrium wage levels. The above, it 
seems to me, is the predominant view among urban and regional econo- 
mists, and Johnson’s paper is certainly consistent with it. 
There is an alternative view, however, attributable to Borts and Stein 
(1964), which suggests demand factors are all important in determining 
areal wage levels. Suppose that in any urban area there exist firms in 
significant numbers which, in the aggregate, have a negligible effect on 
the prices for their products which prevail on national or world markets. 
Furthermore, let the rental values of  capital be fixed by external condi- 
tions to firms in the urban area, a condition most urban and regional 
economists  would  accept.  Then,  if  production  functions  are  ho- 
mogeneous  of  degree one in  labor  and capital,’ there exists  a  fixed 
nominal wage level in the urban area consistent with equilibrium  for 
producers  facing  fixed product  prices and selling in outside markets. 
Competition for labor would require that firms producing for domestic 
consumption or others facing downward sloping product demand sched- 
ules pay the same wage. The latter would be affected only by changes in 
capital rental values or changes in f.0.b. export prices of  firms facing 
perfectly elastic product demand schedules, and not by the total level of 
employment. Factors affecting labor supply schedules, which would have 
to be upward sloping for equilibrium to be determinate, would, under 
these  conditions,  influence  only  an  area’s  total  population  and em- 
ployment; they would have no impact on nominal wages. Admittedly, 
this alternative view is a minority one among urban and regional econo- 
mists.  My  own  work  (Muth 1968), though,  suggests  it  more  closely 332  George E. Johnson 
approximates the U.S. economy during the 1950s than the more conven- 
tional view sketched above. 
Johnson certainly can’t be faulted for not having studied intermetro- 
politan wage differences over time, for the basic data to be used probably 
don’t exist. Yet, changes in wage differentials over time are of  even 
greater interest than their level at a moment in time. One of  the most 
striking features of  the U.S. economy is the convergence of  per capita 
incomes over time, especially the increase in the South relative to the rest 
of the United States. My earlier analysis of Easterlin’s data (Perloff et al. 
1960, chap. 28) together with more recent examinations of Census earn- 
ings data for white urban males for 1950-70  suggest that regional earn- 
ings  differentials  have  been  remarkably  constant for half  a century. 
Rising relative per capita incomes in the South would appear to have 
resulted primarily from a declining relative importance of  agriculture in 
southern states. It would be nice, though, if  we  had a study as well done as 
Johnson’s for some earlier period, such as 1950, from which we  could 
better  appraise the influence of  changes in wage differentials on the 
regional covergence of  per capita incomes. 
Note 
1. In the revised version of his paper, Johnson correctly argues that resources as an input 
into production make the demand for labor less than perfectly elastic. If  resources as an 
input into the production of exportable commodities are relatively unimportant, however, 
the less than perfectly elastic demand may be of  little practical significance. 
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